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FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLES AND THE JURY
ETHAN J. LEIB, MICHAEL SEROTA & DAVID L. PONET*
ABSTRACT
This Essay argues that because jurors exercise state authority
with wide discretion over the legal and practical interests of other
citizens, and because citizens repose trust and remain vulnerable to
jury and juror decisions, juries and jurors share important similari-
ties with traditional fiduciary actors such as doctors, lawyers, and
corporate directors and boards. The paradigmatic fiduciary
duties—those of loyalty and care—therefore provide useful
benchmarks for evaluating and guiding jurors in their decision-
making role. A sui generis public fiduciary duty of deliberative
engagement also has applications in considering the obligations of
jurors. This framework confirms much of what we know about the
jury’s form of political representation and also recommends some
practical directions for jury reform.
* Ethan J. Leib is Professor of Law at Fordham Law School; Michael Serota holds a J.D.
from the University of California, Berkeley School of Law; and David L. Ponet is
Parliamentary Specialist at the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). Thanks to
Fordham Law School for providing financial support and to the William & Mary Law Review
for the invitation to write this Essay.
1109
1110 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1109
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111
I. FIDUCIARY POLITICAL THEORY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116
A. Political Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116
B. Private Fiduciaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117
C. Public Fiduciaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120
II. THE JUROR & JURY AS FIDUCIARIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123
A. Discretion, Trust, and Vulnerability in the
American Jury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123
1. Discretion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123
2. Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125
3. Vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127
B. Mapping the Fiduciary Relationship in the 
Jury Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
III. JURIES’ AND JURORS’ FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS . . . . . . . . . 1134
A. The Duty of Loyalty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134
B. The Duty of Care . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
C. Deliberative Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140
D. Is Juror Fiduciary Obligation Sufficiently 
Juridical? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147
2014] FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLES AND THE JURY 1111
INTRODUCTION
The American jury has long been considered a political institu-
tion,1 rooted in a deep tradition of representative self-government.2
But in what sense is the jury part of our system of democratic
representation? By applying random and compulsory juror selection
procedures, the jury system seeks jury pools that reflect a given
jurisdiction’s diversity.3 This is representation in its descriptive
valence.4 From this vantage point, the jury aspires to be among the
most representative political institutions in American political life.5
1. E.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 272 (J.P. Mayer ed., George
Lawrence trans., Anchor Books 1969) (1835) (“The jury is ... above all a political institution,
and it is from that point of view that it must always be judged.”); Douglas G. Smith,
Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative Analysis and Proposals for
Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441, 470-71 (1997) (noting that, from the time of the founding, the
jury’s “function [as a political institution] ... was recognized by both proponents and opponents
of jury trial”).
2. E.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1169, 1169 (1995) (“No idea was more central to our Bill of Rights—indeed, to America’s
distinctive regime of government of the people, by the people, and for the people—than the
idea of the jury.”); Smith, supra note 1, at 474 (noting the jury is “an organ of the people’s
original sovereignty”).
3. See generally About Jury Service, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/
FederalCourts/JuryService/about-jury-service.aspx (setting forth federal jury selection
procedures) (last visited Jan. 29, 2014); Jury Selection, Trial and Deliberations, NATIONAL
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, http://www.ncsc.org/topics/jury/jury-selection-trial-and-
deliberations/state-links.aspx?cat=Juror%20Information (providing links for state jury
selection procedures) (last visited Jan. 29, 2014).
4. See, e.g., Martha L. Minow, From Class Actions to Miss Saigon: The Concept of
Representation in the Law, 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 269, 290-91 (1991) (“At stake in the
composition of juries is a conception of that decision-making body as a representative cross-
section of the society. Achieving at least symbolic community participation in justice, this
cross-section appearance provides the ‘likeness’ version of representation, the resemblance
to the larger community.”); Jason M. Solomon, The Political Puzzle of the Civil Jury, 61
EMORY L.J. 1331, 1356 (2012) (describing “descriptive representation” as “the claim that the
civil jury looks like the community from which it was drawn,” and noting that, “[t]o the extent
that twelve people can represent a cross section of the community on things like gender, race,
and ethnic background, we say that the jury represents the community”); see also HANNA
FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 89-91 (1967) (elaborating upon the
concept of descriptive representation).
5. Jury selection procedures are imperfect, and there is a significant body of literature
detailing their shortcomings. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, The Means and Ends of
Representative Juries, 1 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 445, 446 (1994) (stating that federal jury pools
are under-representative in terms of race, ethnicity, age, and income level); Cynthia A.
Williams, Note, Jury Source Representativeness and the Use of Voter Registration Lists, 65
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Yet diverse juries are not a sure path to justice.6 Beyond descriptive
representation that is so much a focus of jury scholarship7 and
jurisprudence,8 there is also a normative component of political
representation in the jury: it is generally believed that representa-
tives stand in for, and must act in the interests of, those whom they
represent.9 This Essay explores the normative dimension of the
jury’s political representation.
Scholars and courts have not completely missed that jurors are
political representatives in a normative sense, of course.10 But they
have not generally brought us back to basics to unpack fundamental
political-theoretic concepts of democratic political representation
that might illuminate this institution of representative self-
government. Any proper understanding of the jury’s representative
function should have something to say about three basic questions
N.Y.U. L. REV. 590, 614-15 (1990) (reporting that federal jury source lists under-represent
low-income persons by approximately 20 percent).
6. See PITKIN, supra note 4, at 89 (“We tend to assume that people’s characteristics are
a guide to the actions they will take, and we are concerned with the characteristics of our
legislators for just this reason. But it is no simple correlation; the best descriptive
representative is not necessarily the best representative for activity or government.”). But see
Tracey L. Altman, Note, Affirmative Selection: A New Response to Peremptory Challenge
Abuse, 38 STAN. L. REV. 781, 790-91 (1986) (“Because people with different life experiences
have different perceptions and perspectives, what is important [for juries] is an overall quality
of representativeness, not some objective standard of individual neutrality.... [T]he jury is not
a scientific instrument but rather a body that, through its diversity, can be fair.”).
7. See Laura Gaston Dooley, Sounds of Silence on the Civil Jury, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 405
(1991); Kim Forde-Mazrui, Jural Districting: Selecting Impartial Juries Through Community
Representation, 52 VAND. L. REV. 353 (1999); Richard M. Re, Re-Justifying the Fair Cross
Section Requirement: Equal Representation and Enfranchisement in the American Criminal
Jury, 116 YALE L.J. 1568 (2007); Mitchell S. Zuklie, Rethinking the Fair Cross-Section
Requirement, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 101 (1996).
8. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (“We accept the fair-cross-
section requirement as fundamental to the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and
are convinced that the requirement has solid foundation.”); Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217,
227 (1946) (“Trial by jury presupposes a jury drawn from a pool broadly representative of the
community.”).
9. E.g., 3 EDMUND BURKE, THE WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF THE RIGHT
HONOURABLE EDMUND BURKE 354 (London, Francis & John Rivington, 1852) (noting the duty
of representatives to seek the interests of their constituents); PITKIN, supra note 4, at 209-10
(noting the sense in which representing “means acting in the interests of th[ose] [that are
being] represented”).
10. See, e.g., Valerie P. Hans, Juries as Conduits for Culture?, in FAULT LINES: TORT LAW
AS CULTURAL PRACTICE 80, 80 (David M. Engel & Michael McCann eds., 2009); Victoria A.
Farrar-Myers & Jason B. Myers, Echoes of the Founding: The Jury in Civil Cases as Conferrer
of Legitimacy, 54 SMU L. REV. 1857, 1860 (2001); Smith, supra note 1, at 470-74.
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of democratic representation11: who is to be represented, how they
are to be represented, and what institutional arrangements are
likely to secure high-quality representation. Although these
questions are a staple of political science and political philosophy as
they pertain to elected officials, they have generally (although not
entirely12) been overlooked in contexts in which lay citizens assume
representative roles.13
These questions—who should be represented, how they should
be represented, and which institutions can help guarantee
representation—are not unique to democratic political representa-
tion. The private law asks these questions in relationships in which
one actor or set of actors, a “fiduciary,” is charged with representing
the interests of another or a class of others, a “beneficiary.”14 The
private law has developed a rich set of legal principles used to
analyze and structure these representative relationships.15
11. See generally SUZANNE DOVI, THE GOOD REPRESENTATIVE (2007); BERNARD MANIN,
THE PRINCIPLES OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1997); PITKIN, supra note 4, at 7
(providing a conceptual analysis and “a study in the history of political thought, tracing the
treatment of representation by major political theorists”); NADIA URBINATI, REPRESENTATIVE
DEMOCRACY: PRINCIPLES AND GENEALOGY (2006); MÓNICA BRITO VIEIRA & DAVID RUNCIMAN,
REPRESENTATION (2008); Jane Mansbridge, Rethinking Representation, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
515 (2003); Andrew Rehfeld, Representation Rethought: On Trustees, Delegates, and
Gyroscopes in the Study of Political Representation and Democracy, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 214
(2009); Nadia Urbinati, Representation as Advocacy: A Study of Democratic Deliberation, 28
POL. THEORY 758 (2000); Suzanne Dovi, Political Representation, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/political-representation (last modified Oct. 17, 2011).
12. For accounts of how citizens serve as representatives, see Mark B. Brown, Survey
Article: Citizen Panels and the Concept of Representation, 14 J. POL. PHIL. 203 (2006); Ethan
J. Leib & David L. Ponet, Citizen Representation and the American Jury, in IMPERFECT
DEMOCRACIES: THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 269 (Patti
Tamara Lenard & Richard Simeon eds., 2012); Mark Stephan, Citizens as Representatives:
Bridging the Democratic Theory Divides, 32 POL. & POL’Y 118 (2004); Mark E. Warren, Citizen
Representatives, in DESIGNING DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 50 (Mark E. Warren & Hilary
Pearse eds., 2008).
13. For a recent effort at construing citizens voting in direct democracy as political
representatives, see Michael Serota & Ethan J. Leib, The Political Morality of Voting in Direct
Democracy, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1596 (2013). Citizen representation occurs not only in the jury
but also within many experiments in deliberative and participatory democracy that use the
jury as inspiration. See, e.g., ETHAN J. LEIB, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A
PROPOSAL FOR A POPULAR BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 23 (2004) (calling for a “Popular Branch”
of government using stratified random samples of citizens); Ned Crosby et al., Citizen Panels:
A New Approach to Citizen Participation, 46 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 170 (1986) (convening and
reporting on the performance of Citizen Panels).
14. See infra Part I.B.
15. See infra Part I.B.
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In general terms, fiduciaries exercise discretionary power over
the legal and practical interests of beneficiaries. In fiduciary
relationships, a beneficiary is vulnerable to a fiduciary’s potentially
predatory or self-dealing actions, yet must still repose her trust in
the fiduciary. Because of the power dynamics in these relationships,
the law traditionally imposes substantial duties upon fiduciaries as
a way of keeping them in line and incentivizing them to prioritize
their beneficiaries’ interests above their own.16 Here, we argue that
the body of jurisprudence emerging from the law’s engagement with
these principles, fiduciary law, can be brought to bear on relation-
ships of political representation in the public sphere, thereby
shedding light on the jury’s role as an institution of democratic
representation.17
The Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I argues that although
fiduciary principles have been developed and applied mostly in
private law contexts, the same principles nonetheless apply to the
exercise of state authority by public officials.18 The characteristics
16. See generally LEONARD I. ROTMAN, FIDUCIARY LAW (2005); J.C. SHEPHERD, THE LAW
OF FIDUCIARIES (1981); L.S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 20 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69 (1962); J.C.
Shepherd, Towards a Unified Concept of Fiduciary Relationships, 97 LAW. Q. REV. 51 (1981);
Ernest J. Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (1975).
17. Others have tried this exercise in the reverse direction by taking from political
philosophy’s accounts of representation to learn something about corporate forms of
representation. See Andrew Verstein, Trustee or Delegate? Understanding Representation to
Illuminate Shareholder Governance and Regulatory Change, 9 EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV. 74
(2012).
18. See, e.g., EVAN FOX-DECENT, SOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE: THE STATE AS FIDUCIARY (2011);
Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency
Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441 (2010) [hereinafter Criddle, Administration]; Evan J.
Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 117 (2006)
[hereinafter Criddle, Foundations]; Evan Fox-Decent, The Fiduciary Nature of State Legal
Authority, 31 QUEEN’S L.J. 259 (2005); Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, A
Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 699 (2013) [hereinafter Leib, Ponet & Serota,
Judging]; Ethan J. Leib & David L. Ponet, Fiduciary Representation and Deliberative
Engagement with Children, 20 J. POL. PHIL. 178 (2012) [hereinafter Leib & Ponet,
Representation]; Robert G. Natelson, Judicial Review of Special Interest Spending: The
General Welfare Clause and the Fiduciary Law of the Founders, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 239,
245 (2007) [hereinafter Natelson, Judicial Review]; Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and
the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077, 1088-91 (2004) [hereinafter Natelson, The
Constitution]; David L. Ponet & Ethan J. Leib, Fiduciary Law’s Lessons for Deliberative
Democracy, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1249 (2011) [hereinafter Ponet & Leib, Deliberative Democracy];
D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671 (2013). Much of this work
was foreshadowed in Paul Finn, The Forgotten “Trust”: The People and the State, in EQUITY:
ISSUES AND TRENDS 131, 132 (Malcolm Cope ed., 1995).
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of a fiduciary relationship—discretion, trust, and vulnerability—are
also constitutive of relationships of political representation.
Part II then considers whether the fiduciary model of gover-
nance has application to the jury. We first explain why the jury’s
authorization to engage in discretionary state action19 and apply the
coercive force of the state—when viewed in the light of the concomi-
tant vulnerability and need for trust by the populace—satisfy the
tripartite indicia characteristic of a fiduciary relationship. We
thereafter address two relational questions central to applying
fiduciary principles to those representative relationships that
involve multifarious actors: First, who, precisely, is the fiduciary?
The juror as an individual? The jury as a group? Both the juror and
the jury? Second, who, precisely, is the beneficiary? The litigating
parties? The “people”? Both the litigating parties and the people?20
After concluding in Part II that both the individual juror and the
petit jury as a whole are fiduciaries for “the people,” Part III
considers the attendant fiduciary obligations that flow from this
role. Part III specifies three public fiduciary duties—the duty of
loyalty, the duty of care, and the duty of deliberative engage-
ment—and discusses their potential application to the practice of
juror representation. Some of these duties, upon further analysis,
reflect long-established jury practices, whereas others are novel,
suggesting potential avenues of jury reform.
Ultimately, we conclude that a fiduciary model of the juror and
jury has much to add to our understanding of the jury. It not only
illuminates the jury’s role as a representative institution, but it also
recommends ways of improving the orientation of jury service while
providing the citizen-juror with practical guidance as to how to carry
out her representative function.
19. On the jury and state action, see Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S.
614, 624 (1991); Christopher S. Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2: Of Biased Votes,
Unconstitutional Elections, and Common Law Statutes, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 377, 435 (2012).
20. For an essay about the difficulty of moving from the private law fiduciary relationship
to a public frame, see Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, Translating Fiduciary
Principles into Public Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 91 (2013).
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I. FIDUCIARY POLITICAL THEORY
This Part explains why fiduciary principles provide a useful lens
through which to understand power exercised by public officials. We
highlight some basic questions raised by representative relation-
ships in the public sphere and then explain how the private law of
fiduciaries addresses some of these questions. We conclude this Part
by setting forth the functional and historical arguments for viewing
political representatives as public fiduciaries.
A. Political Representation
Popular sovereignty and representative government share an
uneasy relationship. What does it mean for “the people” to rule
themselves when decisions are usually being made by a select few
representatives? Ballot-casting is intermittent—every two, four, or
six years—and hardly constitutes a regular, direct, or discrete form
of self-rule—especially when one considers that many citizens vote
for candidates who lose. And what of many bureaucrats and judges,
who not only wield enormous authority, but were never elected and
are often difficult to remove from office? Political theorists of
democracy have grappled with these questions for centuries.
Questions about which constituent or principal the representative
is to serve—the district, the state, or the nation as a whole—as well
as the function the representative is to play—as trustee, as
delegate, or as mirror—abound.
Not surprisingly, then, political philosophers have attempted to
expound accounts of representation that seek to provide norms and
standards for evaluating and guiding representative performance.21
Given how much power state officials wield in the name of “the
people,” and how limited “the people” are in their ability to monitor
and control representatives’ actions, some ethical precepts are
necessary to help ensure that governors indeed act after the
interests of the governed.22 But where might such precepts be
21. See Leib & Ponet, Representation, supra note 18, at 181-82 (discussing the
shortcomings of these accounts).
22. See, e.g., Leib, Ponet & Serota, Judging, supra note 18, at 712.
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found? One potential solution is to consider whether analogous
situations of representation exist and, if so, to explore whether they
have anything to teach us about the best way to think about the
work that public officials do.
In the next Section, we explain how many of the challenges
political representation pose are not unique to the public sphere.
They surface in countless contexts in which one party (the represen-
tative) is charged with attending to the interests or assets of
another party (the represented), but the principal cannot fully
monitor or compel her representative’s actions. The private law
addresses these types of representational relationships through the
application of fiduciary principles.
B. Private Fiduciaries23
The private law routinely encounters similar questions about
representation in which one actor is charged with representing and
acting for the interests of another. Such relationships include, for
example, those between attorneys and clients, agents and princi-
pals, trustees and beneficiaries, and corporate officeholders and
shareholders.24 In these relationships, one actor has been delegated
legal authority to make decisions that bind another, giving rise to
inquiries about the nature of the power relationship between the
parties, the types of obligations that flow from the relationship, the
particular interests to be represented—where beneficiaries are
diverse—and how to incentivize or secure compliance by those
serving in a representative capacity. The private law draws on
fiduciary principles to craft governance regimes for these relation-
ships of representation.
Generally speaking, a fiduciary relationship emerges in contexts
in which one person (the fiduciary) has discretionary power over the
legal or practical interests of another (the beneficiary).25 The law
23. This Section borrows from Ethan J. Leib, Friends as Fiduciaries, 86 WASH. U. L. REV.
665 (2009); Leib & Ponet, Representation, supra note 18; and Leib, Ponet & Serota, Judging,
supra note 18.
24. D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV.
1399, 1400 (2002).
25. See, e.g., Evan J. Criddle, Proportionality in Counterinsurgency: A Relational Theory,
87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073, 1089 (2012); Paul B. Miller, A Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 56
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requires those who manage the affairs and assets of beneficiaries to
operate within strict legal and ethical requirements that demand
fidelity to beneficiary interests. These requirements stem from the
nature of the discretion afforded to the fiduciary, the trust reposed
and presumed by the beneficiary, and the vulnerability to which
beneficiaries are subject.26 Accordingly, three indicia identify
fiduciary relationships: discretion, trust, and vulnerability. Where
these tripartite indicia exist, the private law imposes substantial
obligations upon fiduciaries as a way of keeping them in line and
incentivizing them to prioritize their beneficiaries’ interests above
the fiduciary’s own.27
An important feature of fiduciary law is that it identifies
fiduciary relationships and imposes fiduciary obligations differen-
tially.28 That is, once a particular relationship is identified as
fiduciary, judges do not apply a one-size-fits-all approach: the way
in which fiduciary obligations are enforced tends to be calibrated in
a manner sensitive to the type of relationship at issue. In other
words, 
Although an agent, a trustee, a corporate director, a parent, and
a lawyer can all be fiduciaries owing a duty of loyalty [the
quintessential fiduciary duty] to their beneficiaries, that duty is
enforced ... with varying degrees of strictness, according to the
characteristics of the particular relationship at issue. This
variance makes sense because, although these fiduciaries all
exercise discretionary power over a beneficiary’s assets or
MCGILL L.J. 235, 235 (2011). According to Justice Wilson’s judgment in Frame v. Smith: 
Relationships in which [ ] fiduciary obligation[s] have been imposed seem to
possess three general characteristics: 
(1) The fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some discretion or power. 
(2) The fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so as to
affect the beneficiary’s legal or practical interests. 
(3) The beneficiary is peculiarly vulnerable to or at the mercy of the
fiduciary holding the discretion or power.
[1987] 2 S.C.R. 99 (Can.).
26. See FOX-DECENT, supra note 18, at 299 (“[P]ower and vulnerability are intimately
related. The kind of vulnerability at issue arises .... on account of the fiduciary’s unilateral
power to affect the beneficiary’s interests.”); Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV.
795, 810 (1983).
27. See sources cited infra note 34.
28. Leib, Ponet & Serota, supra note 20, at 93.
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interests, the power structures that inhere in [these relation-
ships] are qualitatively different.29
The judicial application of fiduciary duties is, however, compli-
cated by the fact that it is not always clear whose interests a
fiduciary is bound to pursue, and thus, to whom a fiduciary’s duties
apply. Sometimes the private law has a clear answer to the
question. For example, in the case of a private law agent, the
principal’s interests are the priority, whereas in the case of a
guardian, a ward’s best interests are the relevant touchstone. But
corporate law, where much modern fiduciary law gets expounded
and developed by courts, can sometimes display some ambiguity
about whom a representative represents.30
Corporate law has two traditional answers to the question of
whom corporate representatives—directors always and managers
generally—are supposed to represent in their administration and
governance. Courts and commentators have not fully settled on
which of the two answers is correct, but two classes of constituents
are plausible beneficiaries for the protection of corporate
fiduciaries31: shareholders and the “entity.”
The conventional and likely dominant “shareholder primacy”
view holds that because the shareholders are the owners of the
corporation, the corporation must be run for their benefit.32
Accordingly, the shareholder primacy approach has a specific and
unitary mapping of whose interests are represented by corporate
representatives: the shareholders’.
The “entity” theory, by contrast, has a more complex and
multifarious set of constituents whose interests are supposed to be
represented by corporate governors. A corporation is run not only for
the shareholders, under the entity view, but also for creditors,
consumers, labor, and the public. In short, the entity, or institution,
has interests that management ought to serve and represent;
29. Id. 
30. See Frankel, supra note 26, at 804-08.
31. This is the “Berle-Dodd” debate. See A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in
Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931); A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are
Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate
Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932).
32. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.”).
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representation is meant to protect the interests of stakeholders, not
just shareholders.33 Both of these models have judicial cases to
support them34—and corporate law can be said to be ambivalent
about these approaches to representation.35
To briefly recap, the private law envisions representative
relationships founded upon a modicum of discretion, vulnerability,
and trust. Where such indicia exist, the private law enforces a
relational and context-sensitive set of duties that must guide the
work of representatives. As this sketch demonstrates, the theory
and practice of fiduciary law has much to say about the nature,
obligations, and regulation of representation. In the next Section,
we consider whether the private law’s way of understanding and
addressing the complexities of representation may help to illumi-
nate representative relationships as they exist in the public-political
sphere.
C. Public Fiduciaries36
Whether the law of fiduciaries can shed light on political
representation depends upon the extent to which ruler-ruled
relationships exhibit characteristics similar to the relationships of
trust that fiduciary law controls in the private law. A close consider-
ation of the function and structure of relationships of political
33. See generally William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business
Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261 (1992) (examining the competing “property conception”
and “social entity conception” of the corporation); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team
Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999) (concluding that corporate law
encourages directors to further the interests of “all stakeholders who comprise the corporate
‘team’”). But see Renée B. Adams, Amir N. Licht & Lilach Sagiv, Shareholders and
Stakeholders: How Do Directors Decide?, 32 STRATEGIC MGMT. 1331 (2011) (providing
empirical evidence of directors’ tendencies to decide in favor of shareholders).
34. The more controversial cases fall on the “entity theory” side. See Paramount
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154-55 (Del. 1989); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petrol
Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985); Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns
Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *1155-56 & n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). On
the “shareholder primacy” side, see Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684.
35. See Allen, supra note 33, at 264 (“Two inconsistent conceptions have dominated our
thinking about corporations.... Each conception could claim dominance for a particular period,
or among one group or another, but neither has so commanded agreement as to exclude the
other from the discourse of law or the thinking of business people.”).
36. This Section borrows from Leib & Ponet, Representation, supra note 18; Leib, Ponet
& Serota, Judging, supra note 18; and Leib, Ponet & Serota, supra note 20.
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representation suggests that private law fiduciary principles are,
indeed, relevant.
A distinctive feature of the fiduciary relationship—the inequal-
ity and asymmetry between fiduciary and beneficiary—maps well
onto the relationship between public officials and those they govern.
The fiduciary’s possession of greater expertise, information, and
power than the beneficiary leaves the beneficiary vulnerable to the
fiduciary’s predation.37 Ultimately, a fiduciary rendering of public
authority accords with the reality that government officials enjoy a
wide berth of discretion in making decisions that affect the interests
and resources of their entrustors, irrespective of the level or place
they occupy in the hierarchy of government. Legislators, for
example, have control over citizens by being able to criminalize their
conduct, take their money for taxes, take their property for “public
use,” and spend public resources in their name. Citizens are quite
vulnerable to the potential abuse of such power, and yet they have
little choice but to trust those who govern them.38 The relationship
between public officers and citizens, accordingly, reflects the three
indicia that characterize a private fiduciary relationship: discretion,
trust, and vulnerability.39
Understanding state actors as fiduciaries also enjoys a strong
historical inheritance. Although fiduciary principles have their roots
in the private law, a fiduciary rendering of public authority can be
traced back to antiquity.40 Sovereign institutions were thought to
hold citizens’ interests in a public trust. When an arm of the
sovereign exercised political power, that power was deemed to be
constrained by fiduciary standards.41 This deeply rooted under-
standing was premised on citizens’ vulnerability to the potential
37. See Smith, supra note 24, at 1414 nn.57 & 62.
38. On elector trust of representatives, see WILLIAM T. BIANCO, TRUST: REPRESENTATIVES
AND CONSTITUENTS (1994); and DEMOCRACY AND TRUST (Mark E. Warren ed., 1999).
39. The Supreme Court, at least at one time, seems to have shared this view. Consider:
[T]he power or control lodged in the State ... is to be exercised, like all other
powers of government, as a trust for the benefit of the people, and not as a
prerogative for the advantage of the government, as distinct from the people, or
for the benefit of private individuals as distinguished from the public good.
Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896), overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322
(1979).
40. See Natelson, Judicial Review, supra note 18, at 245; Natelson, The Constitution,
supra note 18, at 1097-1101.
41. See Criddle, supra note 25, at 1090-93.
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abuse of discretionary governmental power and on citizens’ need to
repose trust in their governors and public institutions, sometimes
by express delegation and sometimes without explicit conferral.42
The founders of the United States—inheriting Greek, Roman, and
British political theory and common law43—also recognized the
relevance of fiduciary principles as applied to the public political
sphere.44 Indeed, the U.S. Constitution was thought to be designed
as the fiduciary law of public power, delimiting governmental
authority and directing it to the benefit of citizen-beneficiaries.45
In accordance with these functional and historical insights, there
has been a recent flurry of scholarship under the rubric of what
might be called “fiduciary political theory.” Scholars in this line of
inquiry apply the principles of fiduciary law to the realm of public
governance in order to better illuminate the representative relation-
ships that exist therein. Important contributions in this growing
field have demonstrated the extent to which fiduciary principles
describe well, and can help to orient, the quality of representation
public officers render—and are supposed to render—to those they
rule. Such contributions reveal that fiduciary principles enhance our
understanding of the representative obligations that inhere in
elected office,46 while also providing a useful frame for the represen-
tative relationships shared between non-elected public officials (for
example, federal judges47 and administrators48) and those subject to
42. See id. at 1089-90.
43. See Natelson, The Constitution, supra note 18, at 1083-85 (“At the federal convention,
ideals of fiduciary government were enunciated.”); see also Paul Stanton Kibel, The Public
Trust Navigates California’s Bay Delta, 51 NAT. RESOURCES J. 35, 36 (2011) (“The origins of
the public trust reach back centuries and millennium to old English and Roman law, yet the
public trust continues to have far-reaching effects today throughout the United States.”);
Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the
Environment for Present and Future Generations (Part I): Ecological Realism and the Need
for a Paradigm Shift, 39 ENVTL. L. 43, 69 (2009) (“The public trust obligation is the oldest
expression of environmental law, dating back to Justinian times and Roman law.”).
44. See Finn, The Forgotten “Trust”, supra note 18, at 135 (“[I]n the United States after
the Revolution, the fiduciary status of public officials followed inexorably from the embrace
in that country of the idea of popular sovereignty.”).
45. See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 284-87 (2011).
46. See, e.g., Sung Hui Kim, The Last Temptation of Congress: Legislator Insider Trading
and the Fiduciary Norm Against Corruption, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 845 (2013); Leib & Ponet,
Representation, supra note 18; Ponet & Leib, Deliberative Democracy, supra note 18, at 1255-
61; Rave, supra note 18.
47. See Leib, Ponet & Serota, Judging, supra note 18.
48. See Criddle, Foundations, supra note 18.
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their authority. But do fiduciary principles have anything to add to
our understanding of the jury? We think so.
Peeling the iterative layers of representation in a modern
democratic polity reveals that there are occasions when citizens are
called into representative service. The American trial jury is the
most notable occasion, as centuries of American political thought
and jurisprudence reveal. It also raises the same theoretical
quandaries of democratic representation that inhere in more
traditional contexts: namely, who are these civic governors supposed
to be representing and what normative benchmarks are to guide
their work? Arguably, these paradigmatic questions of democratic
representation are even more perplexing as applied to the jury,
given its episodic and civic character. But it is for this reason that
fiduciary political theory, with its emphasis on relational rather
than formalistic characteristics of representation, may be useful to
call into service. The balance of this Essay is devoted to exploring
this possibility. We consider first in Part II whether fiduciary
principles have application to the institution of the jury. Having
answered that question in the affirmative, we then explore, in Part
III, what such an application can teach us about the quality of
representation jurors owe those whom they represent.
II. THE JUROR & JURY AS FIDUCIARIES
This Part considers the extent to which fiduciary principles
apply to the jury. We first explain how the representation rendered
by juries exhibits discretion, trust, and vulnerability. Concluding
that fiduciary principles are applicable to the jury, we address some
of the relational complexities underlying this distinct understanding
of jury service.
A. Discretion, Trust, and Vulnerability in the American Jury
1. Discretion
Jurors surely possess significant discretion over the interests of
their fellow citizens. Under the textbook definition of jury service,
jurors apply the law to the disputes before them, which requires
them to “assess credibility, find facts,” and, in civil cases, “determine
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damages.”49 All these tasks entail “considerable discretion.”50 Juries
have even more discretionary authority than is otherwise indicated
by the textbook definition because the line between application and
interpretation of legal norms is ambiguous.51
The interpretive discretion that inheres in the jury’s role is
clearest in the context of civil litigation. Here jurors routinely apply
legal concepts containing “a significant normative or evaluative
component,”52 such as negligence, lewdness, obscenity, and fair
recompense, which entail the identification of community
standards.53 Similarly, discretionary situations also arise in the
criminal arena; at times “[t]he only practical standard” in a given
legal context may be “the jury’s sense of justice.”54 For example, the
causation requirement demands that jurors determine whether a
particular result is “too remote or accidental in its occurrence to
have a [just] bearing on the actor’s liability,”55 and the criminal
recklessness and negligence standards call upon the jury to
determine whether an actor’s disregard of a risk “involves a gross
deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person
would observe in the actor’s situation.”56 In both civil and criminal
cases, then, jurors are authorized to make highly discretionary
decisions based upon “social values, norms of behavior, and what we
expect and have a right to expect from members of our society.”57
49. Perez v. Weingarten Realty Investors, 881 S.W.2d 490, 497 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994)
(Peeples, J., concurring).
50. Id.
51. Cf. RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 65 (2003) (“[A]pplying [a]
legal norm in a particular situation requires an interpretation of that legal standard.”).
52. Solomon, supra note 4, at 1335-36.
53. State v. Shapiro, 300 A.2d 595, 606 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1973).
54. State v. Maldonado, 645 A.2d 1165, 1179 (N.J. 1994).
55. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b), 3(b) (1962) (emphasis added); see JOSHUA DRESSLER,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 189 (6th ed. 2012) (“The decision to attach causal
responsibility for social harm to one, rather than to another, factor is made in a common sense
manner, or by application of moral intuitions, public policy considerations, and/or a sense of
justice.”).
56. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(c)-(d).
57. Martin A. Kotler, Social Norms and Judicial Rulemaking: Commitment to Political
Process and the Basis of Tort Law, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 65, 90-91 (2000); see also Steven
Hetcher, The Jury’s Out: Social Norms’ Misunderstood Role in Negligence Law, 91 GEO. L.J.
633, 647 (2003) (noting the “pervasive role that social norms play in providing grist for the
jury’s concrete application of the reasonable person standard ... in all situations in which lay
jurors deliberate”); Martin A. Kotler, Reappraising the Jury’s Role as Finder of Fact, 20 GA.
L. REV. 123, 133-34 (1985) (“[I]n a classic negligence case ... [d]etermining the reasonableness
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Additionally, the coercive power of the state reinforces the
exercise of juror discretion.58 Jury verdicts are akin to lawmaking by
state actors insofar as they impact legal, economic, and liberty
interests. A verdict of guilt in a criminal case authorizes a judge to
order the infliction of state-sanctioned punishment against a
defendant. An acquittal constrains the state from taking punitive
action against the accused, even when the law and the facts suggest
that the defendant is guilty. And a civil verdict awarding damages
will—should a party refuse to satisfy the judgment
voluntarily—enable the state to coerce payment through various
enforcement mechanisms. Whether liberty, money, or some other
critical resource is at issue, the discretionary power that juries
exercise is a classic place to invite fiduciary constraint.
2. Trust
Trust is also a foundational feature of jury service. As Dan
Markel has observed, “[T]here is no popular consent to the service
rendered by any particular juror in a particular case, and jurors
have no accountability to each other or to citizens around them for
how they deliberate and vote.”59 And yet the difficulty of monitoring
performance does not derogate from but rather reinforces and
underwrites the necessity of trust reposed with jurors. As Evan
Criddle has remarked, “[N]ot delegation per se, but rather the ... ex
post identification of a confidential relation as one founded on trust”
is paramount in defining fiduciary relationships.60
The fiduciary indicium of trust pervades the institution of the
jury. In making the jury a constitutional command, for example, the
Framers of the Constitution understood that they were entrusting
of the defendant’s conduct is essentially a policymaking or legal decision.”).
58. See Kelly L. Cripe, Comment, Empowering the Audience: Television’s Role in the
Diminishing Respect for the American Judicial System, 6 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 235, 274 (1999)
(asserting that jurors should be accountable to their communities because they wield the
coercive power of the state).
59. Dan Markel, State, Be Not Proud: A Retributivist Defense of the Commutation of Death
Row and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 445 (2005); see
also Re, supra note 7, at 1574 (“[J]urors, unlike most community representatives, are neither
elected nor appointed,” and thus “no accountability mechanisms constrain jury decision-
making.”).
60. See Criddle, Foundations, supra note 18, at 126, 146 n.117.
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much to the common sense of laypeople.61 More probative, however,
is how the architecture of the jury—that is, the state and federal
rules that govern the operation of the jury—reinforce that trust by
limiting accountability and transparency. For example, we trust
that jurors will act as neutral arbiters by “ignor[ing] evidence that
is heard at trial but is later ruled inadmissible,”62 by “put[ting] aside
their biases in deliberation,”63 and by disregarding any other
“considerations bearing on their judgment ... that the judge tells
them to put aside.”64 We also trust that jurors will be competent
enough “to make extremely difficult decisions in even the most
complex cases involving technical problems spanning diverse fields
such as engineering, medicine, and commercial finance.”65 Perhaps
most importantly, we trust that jurors will not only “do the right
thing, but to do it for the right reasons.”66 In short, in light of how
hard it is to overturn a jury’s verdict, “the entire jury system is
predicated on juror good faith.”67
And yet, trust of jurors is not only an implicit feature of the jury
architecture; both public officials and the public also appear actually
to trust juries. Judges, for example, declare their trust of juries
outright through their written orders and the occasional judicial law
review article.68 The people’s similar trust of juries can be seen in
61. See Paul Butler, In Defense of Jury Nullification, LITIG. 46, 48 (2004); cf. Amar, supra
note 2, at 1192 (“[B]ut sometimes reasonableness will call for a contextual, common sense
assessment that defies broad categorization, and sometimes a jury will be the best body to
make this common sense and democratic assessment.”).
62. Marcy Strauss, Sequestration, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 63, 87 (1996). 
63. Id.
64. United States v. Mazzone, 782 F.2d 757, 764 (7th Cir. 1986); see also State v.
Muhammad, 678 A.2d 164, 179 (N.J. 1996) (“[W]e trust that those eleven jurors will adhere
to the trial court’s limiting instruction and deliberate about the appropriate sentence without
consideration of those aggravating factors that they found to exist beyond a reasonable
doubt.”); State v. Silva, 600 A.2d 506, 510 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (“We must trust
jurors to fairly consider whether the explanation diminishes the discrediting effect of silence,
by refuting the assumption that silence is unnatural if the witness has truthful exculpatory
information. Fair consideration of the explanation may not come easy to jurors of limited life
experience, but their oath obliges them to try.”).
65. People v. James, No. 211331, 2001 WL 704159, at *9 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2001)
(Whitbeck, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
66. Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951, 992 (2003).
67. Strauss, supra note 62, at 87; see also Lang v. Jamrog, Civ. Case No. 04-40094, 2006
WL 3147745, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2006) (“Trusting juries to follow the court’s
instructions allows the criminal justice system to function.”).
68. E.g., Columbus v. Freeman, 908 N.E.2d 1026, 1031 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (Tyack, J.,
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the frequency with which individual litigants exercise their right to
a jury.69 It has furthermore been observed that minority groups
“trust jurors more than they trust judges to decide the truth of their
allegations of race and sex prejudice”70 and that the public generally
trusts juries more than judges to make the “ultimate ethical
judgment”71: the decision to sentence a criminal defendant to
death.72 Of course, not everyone is so sanguine about juries, and
some do indulge in much mistrust.73 All the same, in light of the
legal system’s design, citizens have no choice but to depend on juries
to undertake their responsibilities in good faith and to use their
power in the best interests of the public. Inviting fiduciary con-
straint can help draw out the structure and content of these
obligations.
3. Vulnerability
Finally, the polity as a whole is vulnerable to jurors. Clearly,
litigants are at the direct mercy of jurors, who can penalize them
dissenting) (“[T]he courts should be trusting juries to reach the correct verdict in a given
case.”); Hoffman, supra note 66, at 992 (“I trust jurors ... to be competent, to take their role
seriously, and to apply the law as instructed. My trust is not a theoretical hope; it is borne
from my experiences on the bench. In the two-hundred-plus jury trials over which I have
presided, I can count on the fingers of one hand the cases in which I thought the jury was
palpably wrong and/or hopelessly confused.”).
69. E.g., Reginald Alleyne, Arbitrators’ Fees: The Dagger in the Heart of Mandatory
Arbitration for Statutory Discrimination Claims, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 45 (2003) (“[I]n
overwhelming numbers, individuals with claims in federal court prefer jury trials to non-jury
trials.”); Andrew D. Leipold, Why Are Federal Judges So Acquittal Prone?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q.
151, 151, 162-63 (2005) (“Federal criminal defendants almost always prefer a jury trial to a
bench trial,” and “this preference for juries has [ ] significantly [increased] over time.”).
70. Beesley v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 717 F. Supp. 781, 782 (N.D. Ala. 1989).
71. See LaTour Rey Lafferty, Florida’s Capital Sentencing Jury Override: Whom Should
We Trust to Make the Ultimate Ethical Judgment?, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 463, 486 (1995)
(“One should trust jurors, as community representatives, to make the ultimate ethical
judgment.”).
72. See, e.g., Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 461 (1984) (“[T]he laws and practice in
most of the States indicate a nearly unanimous recognition that juries, not judges, are better
equipped to make reliable capital sentencing decisions.”); cf. McGarrahan, State Ponders
Changing Steps to Execution, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 3, 1991, at 6B (quoting Florida Governor
Lawton Chiles as stating that in capital sentencing matters, “I trust jurors. I trust them if
they vote for mercy or for death.”).
73. See generally WILLIAM T. PIZZI, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH 200-20 (1999) (criticizing the
criminal jury); Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can’t Do Well: The Jury’s
Performance as a Risk Manager, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 901 (1998) (criticizing the civil jury).
1128 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1109
financially, authorize punishment against them, and generally bring
the coercive apparatus of the state to bear. Yet the discretion that
juries exercise has implications beyond those in the courtroom.
Consider that a criminal jury’s guilty verdict impacts not only the
interests of the accused, but also those of her family, friends, and
the community in which she is embedded. The financial dependents
of a convict, for example, may lose an essential source of economic
and emotional support.74 And a civil verdict awarding damages may
have dire economic consequences for a party’s financial dependents,
clients, and employees.
The polity’s vulnerability to jury discretion can also be a function
of juror inaction. In the criminal context, for example, a jury’s
failure to convict a defendant otherwise guilty of a violent offense
may mean that a dangerous individual is back on the streets,
thereby placing the community at risk. And, in torts cases, the civil
jury often serves as “the last defense” against powerful business
interests “when government standards are weak, outdated, or set by
the regulated industry.”75 Accordingly, the civil jury’s failure to find
guilt or award severe enough damages, thereby altering the manner
in which corporations in a particular industry “balanc[e] the utility
and the hazards of the[ir] products,” may detrimentally impact the
health of those who use and depend on them.76
74. See, e.g., JEREMY TRAVIS ET AL., URBAN INSTITUTE, FAMILIES LEFT BEHIND: THE
HIDDEN COSTS OF INCARCERATION AND REENTRY (2005), available at
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/310882_families_left_behind.pdf. Taxpayers also pay an
extraordinary amount of money to incarcerate a single individual. See, e.g., California’s
Annual Costs to Incarcerate an Inmate in Prison, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE,
http://www.lao.ca.gov/laoapp/laomenus/sections/crim_justice/6_cj_inmatecost.aspx?catid=3
(last visited Jan. 25, 2014) (calculating that from 2008 to 2009 the per year cost to California’s
taxpayers of housing an inmate was $47,102). Thus, in at least one sense, the entire polity is
at the mercy of a criminal jury’s discretion.
75. THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW 198 (2001).
76. CARL T. BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA 219-20 (2001). Michael Sandel
provides an instructive example of how this works:
During the 1970s, the Ford Pinto was one of the best-selling subcompact cars in
the United States. Unfortunately, its fuel tank was prone to explode when
another car collided with it from the rear.... To calculate the benefits to be
gained by a safer gas tank, Ford estimated that 180 deaths and 180 burn
injuries would result if no changes were made. It then placed a monetary value
on each life lost and injury suffered—$200,000 per life, and $67,000 per injury.
It added to these amounts the number and value of the Pintos likely to go up in
flames, and calculated that the overall benefit of the safety improvement would
be $49.5 million. But the cost of adding an $11 device to 12.5 million vehicles
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Lastly, the polity is vulnerable to the exercise of the jury’s
discretionary authority in the sense that systematic juror malfea-
sance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance can lead to the erosion of the
legal system. Juries, for instance, might routinely fail to act with
the attention and care required by failing to catalogue and process
facts and apply relevant laws.77 Or juries might regularly act in a
subversive manner by deliberately ignoring facts, laws, instructions,
or community values and mores.78 Were these sorts of systematic
behaviors to occur with any regularity, juries run the risk of
undermining the efficacy and credibility of the justice system as a
whole, thereby threatening the rule of law values of stability,
uniformity, and predictability that a properly functioning system
requires.79
Whether through action or inaction, then, jurors and juries leave
the polity vulnerable to their legal decision making. And fiduciary
constraint is an intuitive way of ensuring they take care that they
properly serve their fellow citizens.
B. Mapping the Fiduciary Relationship in the Jury Context
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that applying fiduciary
constraint to the jury system’s exercise of state authority coheres
with the general understanding of fiduciary principles. However, we
must first address some relational complexity. Establishing a
fiduciary relationship requires identifying a relevant fiduciary and
a relevant beneficiary or class of beneficiaries. This is one of the
hardest and most underexplored areas of fiduciary political theory.
But without this essential clarification, it is difficult to design or
would be $137.5 million. So the company concluded that the cost of fixing the
fuel tank was not worth the benefits of a safer car.
MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT’S THE RIGHT THING TO DO? 43-44 (2009).
77. See, e.g., Monica K. Miller & Brian H. Bornstein, Juror Stress: Causes and
Interventions, 30 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 237, 243-44 (2004).
78. See Note, Richardson v. Marsh: Codefendant Confessions and the Demise of
Confrontation, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1876, 1881 n.36 (1988).
79. See Brenner M. Fissell, Jury Nullification and the Rule of Law, LEGAL THEORY
(forthcoming 2014), available at http://www.academia.edu/4020315/Jury_Nullification_and_
the_Rule_of_Law (arguing that juries not following the law derogates from important rule of
law values); see also Michael Serota, Stare Decisis and the Brady Doctrine, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 415, 429 (2011) (noting the rule of law values of stability, uniformity, and predictability).
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calibrate the specific duties that attach to state actors who are in
relationships of political representation.80
Here are some possibilities in the jury context. It may be that
the jury system as a whole is a fiduciary; it may be that each petit
jury is a fiduciary; or perhaps each individual juror is a fiduciary.
The beneficiary could be “the law” or the “legal system” or “the
state”; one or the other or both of the litigants; or “the people,”
variously understood. Ultimately, our view is that both individual
jurors and the petit jury convened for any individual case are
fiduciaries, with “the people” being the relevant beneficiary. Let us
explain, starting with the relevant beneficiary.
With some reflection, it seems unlikely that the relevant
beneficiary is an abstract entity such as “the law,” “the legal
system,” or “the state.” In previous work, some have suggested that
judicial adjudicators are trustees—or fiduciaries—for the law.81 One
might similarly think the jury or jury members represent the law or
the state generally. But that way of specifying the beneficiary seems
misguided. Political representation has an important relational
dimension that involves a real standing in for other human beings;
identifying the beneficiary in such abstract terms—the law, the
system, the state—does not serve the core idea that the jury or
jurors stand in for other human members of the community.82
Moreover, a common thread in understanding the jury is that it is
a bulwark against the state for the liberty of free citizens.83 The jury
80. We have identified this issue in recent work, Leib, Ponet & Serota, supra note 20, at
93-95 (noting the importance of identifying “the public fiduciary ... the actual beneficiary, and
... the right ways to enforce the constraints of the sui generis fiduciary relationships in the
political sphere”), and are currently writing a paper trying to map these relationships, Ethan
J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, Mapping Public Fiduciary Relationships, in THE
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW (Andrew Gold & Paul Miller eds.,
forthcoming 2014).
81. See, e.g., Sarah M.R. Cravens, Judges as Trustees: A Duty to Account and an
Opportunity for Virtue, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1637, 1639-40 (2005).
82. We acknowledge that if one were attracted to the abstract idea that adjudicators
represent “the Law,” she might not find the fiduciary model of representation particularly
useful.
83. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (“It is this
safeguarding function, preferring the commonsense judgment of a jury as a bulwark ‘against
the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge,’
that lies at the core of our dedication to the principles of a jury determination of guilt or
innocence.” (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1967))); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156;
THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 421 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009); see also 4
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“guard[s] against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of
rulers”84 and is essential in facilitating citizen resistance against an
overreaching state.85 Even when the jury is adjudicating a civil case,
civil juries make statements about the state’s law when they process
and adjudicate the facts. With that mission in view, it seems
unlikely that the jury is best conceived of as a fiduciary for the state
itself.
Does it, then, make sense to think of the parties to a litigation
as beneficiaries of any fiduciary relationship? At first glance, this
seems like the most intuitive framing given that the parties are the
most directly vulnerable to the exercise of power by jury members.
Yet, such a rendering raises complexities of its own. Consider, for
example, that a core requirement of a fiduciary relationship is
loyalty, and that the parties’ interests are perfectly adverse by
design. One might therefore question how a jury or jurors could
fulfill that requirement with respect to both parties in a given
litigation. And yet, the same types of issues arise in the private law,
where large groups of shareholders, whose preferences may collide,
serve as the beneficiary of managerial fiduciary obligations. In
many of these circumstances, the fiduciary should be even-handed
among her adverse beneficiaries.86 By analogy, one might say the
jury is a fiduciary for the parties to a litigation and must be loyal to
both and fair between them.
So, then, it does not take too much imagination to envision the
litigants as beneficiaries in a fiduciary framing of the jury. But are
they the beneficiary, that is, a singular and exclusive class of
beneficiary unto themselves? Having considered the jury’s broadly
representative function,87 we think that such a conclusion is
untenable. The polity as a whole, no less than the litigants to an
individual dispute, is subject to the discretionary authority vested
in juries; is vulnerable to abuse of such authority; and places
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *342.
84. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1780,
at 559 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., William S. Hein & Co. 5th ed. 1994) (1891).
85. See United States v. Polizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d 308, 322 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
86. See Criddle, Foundations, supra note 18, at 131; FOX-DECENT, supra note 18, at 266
n.9. Consider also the ability of elected politicians to be loyal to large classes of citizens who
support opposing political parties.
87. E.g., Lafferty, supra note 71, at 487 (noting that jurors are “community
representatives”); Re, supra note 7, at 1574 (same).
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substantial trust, both structurally implied and actually reposed, in
the jury.88 We therefore think the parties to a litigation, rather than
being independent beneficiaries, share their beneficiary status with
the citizens of the polity; that is, “the people” themselves.
Understanding “the people” as the appropriate beneficiary has
many virtues. To start, it reinforces the jury’s traditional role as a
counterweight to legislative and common law power in elites and
rulers as well as the idea that the jury stands in for the community
and enforces the community’s norms.89 It also facilitates a way to
see the jury as standing in a relationship of political representation
with the polity’s membership, whose laws are being enforced and
tested in a given litigation. This way of identifying the beneficiary
respects the relational dimension of political representation and
confirms the jury’s channeling of “the people” into the legal system,
thereby enabling “the people” to represent themselves in the
application of law to individuals. Admittedly, this identification of
the beneficiary begs questions about how broadly to delineate “the
people.” Is it the people of the district, the people of the region, the
people of the state, or the people of the nation?90 But this is just the
question representatives ought to be asking in any given context or
trial; “the people” still serves as the relevant orientation for the
relational obligation.
Accepting “the people” as beneficiary, who or what is best
thought of as the fiduciary? It is difficult to see the jury system as
a whole serving as the relevant fiduciary because the jury—as a
“mini-legislature”—is supposed to be a stand-in for “the people.”91
88. See supra Part II.A.2.
89. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 154-55 (1967) (“A right to a jury trial is
granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression by the Government.”); AKHIL
REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 88-89 (1998) (describing jurors as “provincials”); Laura I.
Appleman, The Lost Meaning of the Jury Trial Right, 84 IND. L.J. 397, 398 (2009) (claiming
that the “original jury trial right was a community right, not the individual right we currently
envision”); Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 877, 904
(1999) (discussing instances in which the jury can “bring their sense of community norms into
the process of applying the law to the facts”); William E. Nelson, The Lawfinding Power of
Colonial American Juries, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1003, 1003-04 (2010) (characterizing juror power
as the means for the local community to maintain its power to “enjoy to live by their own law
rather than the law of some central authority”).
90. In various ways, we have been struggling with this question in previous work. See
Ethan J. Leib, Localist Statutory Interpretation, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 897, 907 (2013); Leib,
Ponet & Serota, supra note 20, at 93, 95-96.
91. See WILLIAM FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 357 (James Appleton Morgan ed.,
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And since the jury system as a whole really does contain nearly all
of “the people,” it seems incoherent to characterize the system as the
relevant fiduciary. It is also unclear why one should treat the jury
system as the relevant entity for fiduciary representation rather
than the legal system or judicial system more broadly. In any event,
the relational focus of fiduciary principles makes “systems”
counterintuitive fiduciaries.
Instead, we might understand each petit jury as a fiduciary.
These small groups are, after all, the mini-legislatures, serving as
the representatives for “the people.”92 This way of thinking clearly
has its benefits: like a board of directors for a corporation, whose
interests and shareholders are protected through fiduciary duties,
small groups can be considered bound to protect a beneficiary or
multiple beneficiaries. Indeed, when plaintiffs sue for a violation of
the standard fiduciary duty of care, often they are pitching the
relevant fiduciary as the board.93
Yet, many plaintiff suits for violations of the core fiduciary duty
of  loyalty are pitched at the level of an individual director; the
relevant fiduciary obligation flows to each member of the board.
Similar to the story we have been telling about the beneficiary side
of the equation, attention to the relational dimensions of fiduciary-
beneficiary dynamics also recommends thinking of each individual
juror as a representative, even if it is also true that some fiduciary
responsibility flows to the petit jury as a group or panel. For
although it is black letter law that the Constitution requires the
petit jury to be drawn from a representative sample of citizens,94 it
is almost surely the case that the duties of representation flow to
each individual juror. In Part III, we explore the various fiduciary
obligations that ought to be imposed on the juries and jurors.
2d ed. 1994) (1875).
92. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975) (“[T]he Sixth Amendment comprehended
a fair possibility for obtaining a jury constituting a representative cross section of the
community.”)).
93. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkam, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
94. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 528 (citing Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970)); Brown
v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 474 (1953).
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III. JURIES’ AND JURORS’ FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS
Having established the basic fit of the fiduciary model for juries
and jurors in the previous Part, we now explore some practical
ramifications. We specify the public fiduciary duties and then
translate them for the jury context. From the most basic aspects of
jury service, such as selection, impartiality, deliberation, and oaths,
to more provocative issues such as jury nullification, note taking,
witness questioning, and the jury’s ability to be informed about
mandatory minimum sentences, the fiduciary model helps address
ongoing questions about the jury’s institutional design. We proceed
first by applying the basic private law fiduciary duties to the jury:
the duties of loyalty and care. We then explore the duty of delibera-
tive engagement, a uniquely public fiduciary duty.95 This Part seeks
both to confirm the jury-as-fiduciary model—by looking at current
practices and understandings—and to suggest some areas in which
we might use the model in service of reform to help jurors better
perform their jobs as political representatives.
But first, one clarification: although we do not distinguish much
in what follows between criminal and civil jurors,96 our general
model does not change between these contexts, even if the specific
applications of the relevant duties might vary modestly by type of
jury. This is consistent with how fiduciary law works in private law
too: the category and duties supervene and the specific applications
of the duties can be variable and calibrated according to context.97
A. The Duty of Loyalty
The core fiduciary duty, applicable to all fiduciaries, is the duty
of loyalty, a duty of unselfishness. As one commentator has noted,
“The keystone of the duty of loyalty is the legal obligation that the
95. See Leib & Ponet, Representation, supra note 18, at 188-92; Ponet & Leib, Deliberative
Democracy, supra note 18, at 1256-61; Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas L. Brunell, Trustee Courts
and the Judicialization of International Regimes: The Politics of Majoritarian Activism in the
European Convention on Human Rights, the European Union, and the World Trade
Organization, 1 J.L. & CTS. 61, 67-68 (2013).
96. For reasons to treat the different kinds of juries separately, see Solomon, supra note
4, at 1337.
97. See Leib, Ponet & Serota, supra note 20, at 94.
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fiduciary use her powers not for her own benefit but for the
exclusive benefit of her beneficiary.”98 The fiduciary is prohibited
from self-dealing and is required to pursue the interests of her
beneficiary above her own.99 So “inflexible” is the duty of loyalty that
it requires a fiduciary to be “undivided” and “undiluted” in her
faithfulness.100
Transposing the duty of loyalty from the private law context to
the jury requires little imagination. As public fiduciaries, juries
convene to serve the interests of the people and are expected to
remain faithful defenders of their beneficiaries. This understanding
of the jury is nothing new. The Framers, for example, envisioned
that juries would function as “centinels and guardians” of the
people,101 and scholars suggest that the jury’s primary function is to
protect the polity against “the danger that government officials
might attempt to rule in their own self-interest at the expense of
their constituents’ sentiments and liberty.”102 Only a public-interest-
oriented jury, focused upon reinforcing the boundaries of limited
government against rulers prone to overreaching, will actually be
able to fulfill this basic function.103 A jury focused instead upon
98. Lynn A. Stout, On the Export of U.S.-Style Corporate Fiduciary Duties to Other
Cultures: Can a Transplant Take?, in GLOBAL MARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS 46, 55
(Curtis J. Milhaupt ed., 2003).
99. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006) (describing a fiduciary’s duty “to
act loyally for the principal’s benefit”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958)
(describing a fiduciary’s duty “to act solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters
connected with his agency”).
100. Birnbaum v. Birnbaum, 539 N.E.2d 574, 576 (N.Y. 1989).
101. Observations Leading to a Fair Examination of the System of Government Proposed
by the Late Convention; and to Several Essential and Necessary Alterations in It. In a Number
of Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST
214, 50 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) [hereinafter The Federal Farmer].
102. AMAR, supra note 89, at 82.
103. Although the underlying agency cost of representative government may be part of why
we have a jury system, agency costs are also inherent in the very use of representatives, as
the jury system does. By using one set of representatives (in the jury) to protect against
another set of representatives (in the three branches of government), the precise risk of
overreaching that jury rights are intended to check against are at risk in the execution of jury
service. For wherever discretion over the interests of another has been delegated to an
individual—even if that discretion was delegated for the purposes of monitoring an earlier
delegation—there is the potential for abuse. See id. (describing this issue with regard to
English judges of the star chamber). Any individual juror can abuse the power of her office to
extort money or some other resource from those subject to her authority. Individual jurors,
accordingly, are understood to be bound by a similar obligation of loyalty to those whose
loyalty they are charged with policing.
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furthering the material self-interest of its constituent members, or
the partial interests of groups, is unlikely to cultivate the watchdog
role at the core of the jury system’s design.104 Juries, accordingly,
are already understood to be bound by an obligation of loyalty to
their beneficiaries.105
One can see further evidence of the duty of loyalty in the jury’s
commitment to impartiality. Jury selection procedures reveal the
seriousness with which impartiality must be pursued; discernible
prejudice, pre-judgment, and/or a close personal stake in the matter
to be adjudicated can all be predicates for the disqualification of a
juror. “Challenges for cause” highlight the centrality of impartiality
to the jury process. Even peremptory challenges—as long as they
are not exercised in a prejudicial manner—contribute to the
commitment to impartiality as we allow each side to a dispute to
disqualify jurors that they think cannot fairly judge them. Ulti-
mately, various conflict-of-interest checks control entrance to a jury
as one would expect of new fiduciaries. Impartiality is reinforced not
only through oaths upon being seated, which require jurors to
behave in an unbiased fashion without fear or favor,106 but it is also
structurally ensured through mandatory service107 and a “fair cross-
section” requirement.108
104. Jurors, accordingly, should not be understood to “act as spokespersons for competing
group interests ... inevitably favor[ing] their own kind and vot[ing] according to narrow group
loyalties.” JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY 8 (1994). Rather, the jury should be a site of
communally situated rational discourse in which partial interests are filtered out. Id. at 8,
102.
105. See, e.g., id. at 8.
106. The actual words of the juror oath vary by jurisdiction, but all we have seen
foreground the juror’s need to be impartial and unconflicted. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2945.28 (West 2006) (criminal oath).
107. Fiduciary roles tend to be voluntary relationships rather than coerced ones. But in the
case of the juror, the fiduciary role is forced upon citizens. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-69, 1871
(2006). Mandatory service helps execute the vision that the jury as a body must be impartial
and “loyal.” If the jury system allowed only volunteers, it would not be able to guarantee
impartiality in the same way. The imperfect fit on the mandatory service issue is similar to
the imperfect fit of parents as fiduciaries, who also do not really get an opt-out. See Elizabeth
S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401 (1995) (developing a
model of parents as fiduciaries that “best reduce[s] conflicts of interest within the parent-child
relationship”).
108. See Sanjay K. Chhablani, Re-Framing the ‘Fair Cross-Section’ Requirement, 13 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 931, 942-45 (2011) (discussing the development of the “fair cross-section
requirement”).
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Having observed the extent to which the fiduciary duty of loyalty
describes existing jury practices, we now consider its prescriptive
import. The fiduciary duty of loyalty may have something important
to say about the controversial jury practice of “nullification.” Judges
acknowledge that juries in both the criminal and civil contexts
sometimes ignore instructions, fail to apply the law in a technically
accurate way, or bend it to their will in order to effectuate their
sense of justice.109 At first glance, such actions seem to contradict
the juror’s duty of loyalty insofar as they amount to a partial
application of the people’s law. However, careful scrutiny reveals a
more complicated picture.
As a counterforce against overly harsh laws or overzealous
prosecutors whose actions transgress the people’s sense of justice,
one can view jury nullification as a kind of fiduciary check on the
administration of justice. In the words of Judge Learned Hand, the
jury “introduces a slack into the enforcement of law, tempering its
rigor by the mollifying influence of current ethical conventions.”110
General statutes and rules may not serve beneficiary interests at
the retail level. And the act of jury nullification may serve to
channel loyalty to the public interest by conforming to the ethical
intuitions of the people. Historically, this has meant that juries
sometimes ignored the Fugitive Slave Act or refused to issue guilty
verdicts during Prohibition, just as today they may selectively apply
drug laws they perceive as unfair.111 When a jury’s decision
emanates from jurors’ commitment to being loyal to the public
interest, nullification, rather than controverting fiduciary princi-
ples, may actually effectuate them.112
109. See Paula L. Hannaford-Agor & Valerie P. Hans, Nullification at Work? A Glimpse
from the National Center for State Courts Study of Hung Juries, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1249,
1258-62 (2003) (recounting examples of jurors arguably disregarding the law); Lars Noah,
Civil Jury Nullification, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1601, 1622 (2001) (“[J]udges concede that juries
occasionally ignore instructions.”).
110. United States ex rel. McCann v. Adams, 126 F.2d 774, 776 (2d Cir. 1942), order set
aside by 317 U.S. 269 (1942), stayed by 63 S. Ct. 442 (1943).
111. Noah, supra note 109, at 1619.
112. The institution of the jury may have an educative function that reinforces loyalty in
other domains of citizenship too. John Gastil has been leading path-breaking empirical
research on the subject, studying the effects of the jury on its participants and their political
life more generally. For a sampling of the papers published and forthcoming from his “The
Jury and Democracy Project,” see Writings, THE JURY AND DEMOCRACY PROJECT,
http://www.la1.psu.edu/cas/jurydem/writings.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2014). Seeing the jury
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B. The Duty of Care
The second basic fiduciary duty is the duty of care,113 requiring
of fiduciaries reasonable diligence and prudence.114 Unlike the
prohibitive duty of loyalty, the duty of care creates the affirmative
obligation to employ reason-based decision making.115 Yet, fiducia-
ries are provided substantial discretion in executing their role
responsibilities; the “business judgment rule” grants a wide berth
of freedom within the duty of care analysis.116
It is not hard to apply the duty of care to jurors and juries as
fiduciaries. The idea that juries ought to fulfill their responsibilities
with reasonable diligence and prudence is part and parcel of the
conventional understanding of the jury. We expect jurors to engage
in reasoned decision making through careful consideration about
the cases before them. Juries are specifically authorized to resolve
disputes between litigating parties and they are required to execute
that job with care. Although litigants are not the direct beneficiaries
of juries,117 they are often indirect recipients of the command that
juries resolve cases fairly and are the ones with standing to
challenge the jury’s work.
Jurors do not simply vote on matters before them. Rather, they
deliberate about what course of action to take individually and as a
group. A jury might be able to avoid deliberating if it is hell-bent on
refusing,118 or it may achieve unanimity or the relevant
supermajority on the first poll. But people widely assume and
as educative goes back at least to de Tocqueville: “[T]he jury is both the most effective way of
establishing the people’s rule and the most efficient way of teaching them how to rule.” DE
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 276.
113. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (defining duty of care in the
context of corporate directors); see generally ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 123-36
(1986).
114. See Scott & Scott, supra note 107, at 2420 & n.66.
115. See Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944); Robert Cooter & Bradley
J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal Consequences,
66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1047, 1049 n.8, 1062 (1991).
116. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57
VAND. L. REV. 83, 88-100 (2004) (exploring the latitude the business judgment rule provides
corporate directors); Scott & Scott, supra note 107, at 2423-24.
117. See discussion supra Part II.
118. But see Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501-02 (1896) (allowing judges to charge
a deadlocked jury with a firm instruction to work toward a verdict through deliberation).
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strongly desire that the vast majority of actual juries engage in
some measure of reasoned deliberation. Indeed, some argue that the
unanimity rule, in effect in forty-eight state criminal court systems
and the federal court system,119 conduces to and incentivizes
deliberation.120 In civil trials, only twenty-one states still require
unanimity as a general matter, but the remainder require a
supermajority to agree to a verdict as an attempt to ensure active
deliberation.121 Deliberation is essential to meeting a jury and
juror’s duty of care, and courts employ various design strategies to
ensure it.122
The jury system is also structured to facilitate deliberation by
stipulating for and enforcing juror secrecy and privacy.123 Although
some fiduciaries in private law are subject to duties of candor,
disclosure, and accounting,124 jury members are actually insulated
from disclosure and accounting in order to make sure they execute
their core task with diligence and care: the duty of care is more
foundational in the constellation of fiduciary duties, and some
protection from disclosure is necessary for the system to function
properly.125
119. Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Revisiting the Unanimity Requirement: The Behavior
of the Non-Unanimous Civil Jury, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 201, 203 (2006).
120. See, e.g., REID HASTIE, STEVEN D. PENROD & NANCY PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY
228-29 (1983).
121. Diamond et al., supra note 119, at 203 (reporting jury verdict requirements across the
nation). For an argument that one could achieve deliberation in the jury without the
symmetrical unanimity requirement (unanimity required for both conviction or acquittal) and,
indeed, that the symmetrical unanimity requirement may be inimical to deliberation, see
Ethan J. Leib, Supermajoritarianism and the American Criminal Jury, 33 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 141, 168-93 (2006). For an exhaustive survey of the jury decision rules throughout the
United States, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, STATE COURT
ORGANIZATIONS, 233 tbl.42 (2004), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/sco04
.pdf. For some comparative data, see Ethan J. Leib, A Comparison of Criminal Jury Decision
Rules in Democratic Countries, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 629 (2008).
122. Though more strategies are potentially available, such as requiring a jury to wait
several hours before issuing any verdict.
123. Consider Justice Cardozo: “Freedom of debate might be stifled and independence of
thought checked if jurors were made to feel that their arguments and ballots were to be freely
published to the world.” Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933).
124. See Leib, Ponet & Serota, Judging, supra note 18, at 738-40.
125. Just like legislators have some immunity to engage in fulsome debate through the
“speech or debate clause,” see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1, juror fiduciaries get some
immunities to protect their core job of deliberation.
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We also know well that juries have a wide berth of discretion,
consistent with a translation of the “business judgment rule,”
applied to jury business. The business judgment rule is often
thought to exist to enable risk-taking by a corporation’s manage-
ment.126 But there is a corollary with the jury, too: nullification and
the finality of jury verdicts enable forms of legal risk-taking.
Although judges generally review matters of law de novo—and jury
verdicts, other than criminal verdicts of acquittal, of course, can be
subject to post-verdict review for a narrow band of reasons—juries
wield tremendous discretion and command substantial deference,
consistent with what courts traditionally permit within the duty of
care analysis.
The duty of care not only confirms the juries-as-fiduciaries
model, but it also sheds light on some controversial prescriptions. To
the extent that allowing juror note taking and allowing posing of
questions to judges and witnesses remains controversial,127 the
account here would seem to be a modest thumb on the scales in
favor of these prerogatives to help jurors execute their paramount
duty of care with the diligence it warrants.128
C. Deliberative Engagement
Public and private fiduciaries do not have identical fiduciary
obligations. Private and public fiduciaries share the duties of loyalty
and care we have just explored. But public fiduciaries also have
126. David Rosenberg, Supplying the Adverb: The Future of Corporate Risk-Taking and the
Business Judgment Rule, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 216, 217-18 (2009).
127. Some jurisdictions find these to be essential tools for juries, see California Rules of
Court, Rules § 2.1031, § 2.10033, but virtually all jurisdictions will permit some of these tools
to be used at the discretion of the trial judge, see AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, Note Taking Statutes,
http://www.ajs.org/judicial-administration/jury-center/jury-system-overview/jury-
improvement-efforts/improving-trials/permitting-juror-note-taking/notetaking-statutes/ (last
visited Jan. 29, 2014). Analysis of the support and opposition to these propositions, including
some empirical data on the use of these tools, can be found in Mark A. Frankel, A Trial
Judge’s Perspective on Providing Tools for Rational Jury Decisionmaking, 85 NW. U. L. REV.
221, 225 (1990); Larry Heuer & Steven D. Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation in Trials
Through Note Taking and Question Asking, 79 JUDICATURE 256 (1996); Larry Heuer & Steven
Penrod, Some Suggestions for the Critical Appraisal of a More Active Jury 85 NW. U. L. REV.
226 (1990); Smith, supra note 1, at 567-78.
128. For some recent discussion about the desirability of these tools, see Nancy S. Marder,
Two Weeks at the Old Bailey: Jury Lessons from England, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 537, 564-70
(2011) (finding these tools have been insufficiently adopted in the United States).
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what we have elsewhere called a duty of deliberative engagement,
rooted in dialogic imperatives implicated by fiduciary law but not
strictly required of private law fiduciaries.129 In prior works, we
have described the duty of deliberative engagement as an affirma-
tive obligation to engage in dialogue with the public fiduciary’s
beneficiary.130 We have argued that the dialogic duty requires an
effort to pursue a meaningful understanding, and concomitant
consideration, of beneficiary preferences because fiduciaries are too
likely to assume identity between their own interests and their
beneficiaries’ interests without actually consulting their beneficia-
ries.131 Although the public fiduciary is authorized to act in place of
beneficiaries—and to deploy her special expertise to stand in for
beneficiaries—one of the duties of public fiduciary representation in
a democracy is to remain responsive to one’s beneficiaries by always
keeping their best interests in view. And because any claim to
fiduciary responsiveness demands, at the very least, due consider-
ation of beneficiary preferences, public fiduciaries are obliged to
solicit those preferences through a dialogic process of deliberative
engagement. This duty has been applied to executive, legislative,
and judicial state actors in other work,132 and it is worth asking if
there is any application to jurors or juries as state actors.
At first glance, many well-established features of the jury
system seem in tension with the public fiduciary’s duty of delibera-
tive engagement. Juries, though rarely fully sequestered from
society, are routinely instructed not to talk to members of the public
about the details of the cases they hear until after the verdict, and
they are often told explicitly that they may not use the Internet to
do research.133 Moreover, jurors are sometimes chosen precisely
129. Leib, Ponet & Serota, Judging, supra note 18, at 740-52.
130. See Ponet & Leib, Deliberative Democracy, supra note 18, at 1256-57 (“[E]lected rulers
or legislators must deliberatively engage the ruled on account of the fiduciary status in their
unequal relationships with the beneficiaries.”); Leib & Ponet, Representation, supra note 18,
at 190 (“[T]he fiduciary ... should actually talk with real constituents to the extent feasible to
get a clearer sense of the interests she is supposed to be vindicating.”). 
131. See Ponet & Leib, Deliberative Democracy, supra note 18, at 1256.
132. See supra note 18.
133. See, e.g., PROPOSED MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: THE USE OF ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGY
TO CONDUCT RESEARCH ON OR COMMUNICATE ABOUT A CASE (Dec. 2009), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/News/2010/docs/DIR10-018-Attachment.pdf; Herbert B.
Dixon, Jr., Guarding Against the Dreaded Cyberspace Mistrial and Other Internet Trial
Torpedoes, JUDGES’ J., Winter 2010, at 37, 39; Marder, supra note 128, at 572-73.
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because they have not been inundated with public opinion about a
trial and, in fact, possess a desired level of ignorance about the
world around them.134 Thus, contrary to earlier applications of this
public-oriented duty, an absence of deliberative engagement—rather
than an affirmative dialogic imperative—lies at the heart of jury
practice. 
And yet, a consideration of the relational nature of fiduciary
obligation suggests that a modified duty of deliberative engagement,
calibrated according to the particularities of jury representation,
might be a useful way to think through some jury practices and
reform opportunities. At the outset, figuring out precisely how to
design the right constraints and manifestations of the relevant
fiduciary obligations for each kind of fiduciary is complex work.
Fiduciary theory, both public and private, recognizes that relational
differences between different fiduciary relationships compel
variance in the application of the relevant duties.135 For this reason,
the duties agents owe to principals differ from those trustees owe to
beneficiaries, and, more generally, the duties of public fiduciaries
differ from those of private fiduciaries.
Similarly, the public fiduciary duty of deliberative engagement
does not apply seamlessly across government actors. The citizen
representative on the jury is embedded in an institution that needs
to perform its primary duties of loyalty and care first and foremost,
which, in the context of the jury trial, limits the duty of deliberative
engagement to a form not as robust and bilateral as might be
applied to democratically elected representatives. To get the kind of
deliberation we want out of the jury, focused principally on the facts
and law before it, it would not make sense to have too much direct
contact between public opinion and the jury. A narrower duty, one
that ensures the steady flow of material information into the jury
room and facilitates clear juror pronouncements outwards, may
nonetheless be appropriate.
To be sure, common practices already exist in the courtroom that
are plausible approximations of this narrow duty of deliberative
engagement: oral arguments by litigants’ attorneys, which are wide-
134. See, e.g., Fred H. Cate & Newton N. Minow, Communicating with Juries, 68 IND. L.J.
1101, 1103-05 (1993).
135. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L.
& ECON. 425, 432-34 (1993).
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ranging and may draw on community-oriented factors; narrative
construction through the trial process; courtrooms open to the
public; court-furnished jury instructions on the law; public deci-
sions; special verdicts; and liberal standards for amicus curiae
participation. These common practices validate and vindicate the
jury’s role as a fiduciary subject to the dialogic imperative, with
information and deliberation flowing both into the jury’s delibera-
tion and outward to other state actors who must use jury decisions
as input into further policy making.136
That some well-established jury practices reflect a duty of
deliberative engagement is not to say, of course, that they all do.
Design ramifications can still be drawn from this duty to help
reform jury law. In a recent article, for example, former judge Nancy
Gertner argues that it is important to provide jurors with more
information on mandatory sentencing to give “intelligible content”
to the jury function and to enable the jury to perform its task better
by aligning punishment with community norms.137 This seems like
a proposal amenable to support through the jury’s duty of delibera-
tive engagement. Moreover, proposals to allow more post-verdict
information gathering by litigants’ attorneys and others seem like
moderate ways to permit better information flow about whether
jurors are, in fact, executing their other obligations well.138 Even
with some imposition on “finality” and some modest “chilling effect”
on juror deliberations with additional disclosures about what is
going on in the “black box” of the jury, the fiduciary model of the
jury does highlight that some better bonding and monitoring
between the people and the jury may be necessary.
136. As we have shown elsewhere, the judge represents “the people” too and will be able
to promote some deliberative engagement with relevant beneficiaries through her interactions
with judicial peers, other branches, the public, and the jury itself. See Leib, Ponet & Serota,
Judging, supra note 18, at 747-50.
137. Nancy Gertner, Juries and Originalism: Giving “Intelligible Content” to the Right to
a Jury Trial, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 935 (2010).
138. See, e.g., RULE REG. FLA. BAR 4-3.5(d)(4) (2013); Haeberle v. Tex. Int’l Airlines, 739
F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1984); Craig B. Willis, Juror Misconduct: Balancing the Need for Secret
Deliberations with the Right to a Fair and Impartial Trial, 72 FLA. B.J. 20, 24 (1998);
Benjamin M. Lawsky, Note, Limitations on Attorney Postverdict Contact with Jurors:
Protecting the Criminal Jury and Its Verdict at the Expense of the Defendant, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1950 (1994) (proposing a model rule requiring judges to poll jurors with a series of
questions to elicit evidence of any misconduct). For some critical notes on post-verdict
revelations about jury deliberations, see Marder, supra note 128, at 556-61.
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Relatedly, in previous work we have similarly argued that the
judicial branch might utilize an ombudsperson’s office to communi-
cate with the public about judicial opinions that the average
member of society could not otherwise understand in order to
reinforce deliberative engagement from judge to the people.139 The
judicial branch could also utilize an ombudsperson’s office to
summarize jury findings for citizens in an easy-to-digest format. The
average researcher—let alone the average citizen—cannot easily
access knowledge about what is happening within jury trials. An
ombudsperson’s office could help make sure the jury and jurors keep
in view that their work will be disclosed to their beneficiaries and
therewith help them anticipate and think through their beneficia-
ries’ interests better. Such disclosure would also help juries of the
future understand how previous disputes were adjudicated in
similar cases.
Finally, the duty of deliberative engagement may have some-
thing to say about the phenomenon of jury nullification, which
serves not only to rein in the excesses of officials in all three
branches but also constitutes an important signal to legislators that
a law may be in need of alteration.140 To wit, the jury system,
although routinely discussed as a mechanism to adjudicate factual
rather than legal or value questions, generates important general
judgments about the law and values. Kalven and Zeisel’s famous
book on the American jury traced a series of value judgments made
by juries: excusing defendants for the contributory fault of a victim
(when it is not a legal excuse);141 excusing defendants because the
harm caused was de minimis (even when the law recognizes no de
minimis exception);142 excusing defendants because they are being
subjected to unpopular laws;143 excusing defendants because they
have already been subjected to enough punishment;144 considering
139. See Leib, Ponet & Serota, Judging, supra note 18, at 743; Michael Serota, Intelligible
Justice, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 649, 663-65 (2012). For a meditation on the dearth of public legal
knowledge and the implications this has for our constitutional order, see Michael Serota,
Popular Constitutional Interpretation, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1637 (2012).
140. Noah, supra note 109, at 1624.
141. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 242-57 (1966).
142. Id. at 258-85.
143. Id. at 286-97.
144. Id. at 301-05.
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that the punishment for a conviction is too severe;145 excusing
defendants because other defendants are getting preferential
treatment;146 excusing defendants for improper conduct by the police
(when such conduct is not a legal excuse);147 and treating crime in
subcultures differentially by applying standards appropriate (or
inappropriate) to different cultural contexts.148 These general
political and legal judgments, in turn, filter to prosecutors and
lawmakers, thereby influencing executive and legislative policy.
From this perspective, then, the practice of jury nullification might
be viewed as a form of deliberative output produced by citizen
representatives regarding popular judgments on existing laws.149
D. Is Juror Fiduciary Obligation Sufficiently Juridical?
Having discussed the relational similarities between jurors and
private law fiduciaries and specified the application of fiduciary
duties to these citizen representatives, we pause to address an
apparent quirk with the private-to-public translation. The jury-as-
fiduciary model may read oddly because it seems to be a central
feature of fiduciary law to create causes of action or credible threats
of causes of action for judicial enforcement of fiduciary duties.150
One traditionally thinks of fiduciary principles as juridical ones,
which imposes judicially enforced duties upon fiduciary representa-
tives. Yet, jurors are conventionally immune from civil liability for
acts taken within the jury.151
145. Id. at 306-12.
146. Id. at 313-17.
147. Id. at 318-23.
148. Id. at 339-44; see also NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES 341 (2007)
(finding that members of the general public, and thus juries, hold corporate actors to higher
standards “because of their greater knowledge, resources, and potential for impact”).
149. Of course, because verdict forms do not contain a box for “nullification,” policymakers
must interpret jury results over time.
150. See generally Paul B. Miller, Justifying Fiduciary Remedies, 63 U. TORONTO L.J. 570
(2013).
151. See, e.g., Bushell’s Case, [1669] 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P.) 1009 (representing a
canonical case holding that jurors cannot be prosecuted for their verdicts, and establishing
one source of authority for the power of nullification); see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 423 n.20 (1976) (grand jurors are immune); White v. Hegerhorst, 418 F.2d 894, 895 (9th
Cir. 1969) (holding that jurors enjoy a version of judicial immunity); Turpen v. Booth, 56 Cal.
65, 67 (1880) (“No grand juror shall be held liable for damages.”).
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The lack or unavailability of judicial enforcement of juror
fiduciary duties need not be viewed as a stumbling block, however.
Fiduciary principles are not solely juridical constructs. Rather, they
derive from a more basic architectural insight about certain power
relationships and their need for scaffolding to guard against
excessive overreach or predation in the exercise of discretionary
power. Judicial review is just one way—among other efforts at
institutional design—to signal and frame the more basic moral
norms that ought to guide the relationship. As others have noted,
large-scale compliance with private fiduciary obligations is common
because the relevant norms can and do function without judicial
micromanagement.152 Fiduciary law is, of course, designed to
intervene in cases of substantial default; yet imperfect enforcement
may, in fact, be desirable because, as many have assumed, fiduciary
relations would fail with excessive judicial meddling.153
Even without direct civil actions against jurors and juries,
however, it is possible to “enforce” fiduciary constraint among jurors
in a manner. Impeaching verdicts is, of course, possible for large
defaults of juror obligations,154 and judges have supervisory
authority over the work of the jury, which helps keep members
focused on their tasks. The press helps oversee jury work, too.155
Moreover, jurors can be disqualified or challenged for cause,156
which helps ensure the jury-as-fiduciary model is more than mere
rhetoric. Ultimately, the jury-as-fiduciary model both frames and
helps orient our most immediate practice of deliberative and
participatory democracy, which also—as with most democratic
practice—relies on representatives with a lot of discretion. These
citizen representatives, like any other political representative, need
ethical guidelines so as to exercise their power with care and in the
service of the best interests of the polity, regardless of whether
those guidelines are universally enforceable by judges.
152. See Stout, supra note 98, at 47-48, 65.
153. See Leib & Ponet, Representation, supra note 18, at 192.
154. See James W. Diehm, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts: Tanner v. United States and
Beyond, 65 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 389, 406-12 (1991).
155. See Robert J. MacCoun, Media Reporting of Jury Verdicts: Is the Tail (of the
Distribution) Wagging the Dog?, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 539, 542-45 (2006).
156. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 47; FED. R. CRIM. P. 24.
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CONCLUSION
As an institution deeply woven into the fabric of popular
governance, the American jury is a central site for political repre-
sentation: the political representation of citizens by citizens. Just as
the practice of political representation by elected and appointed
officials raises numerous questions about the nature of the relation-
ship between ruler and ruled and the various agency costs associ-
ated therewith, the jury occasions similar questions about the
relationship between the governed and their governors. We continue
to need better ethical frameworks to analyze, evaluate, and guide
these relationships of vulnerability and power.
Many scholars have come to agree that the challenges of
representation that appear in the public governance context share
attributes with parallel difficulties in private law relationships.
When representation can be characterized by some quantum of
three indicia—discretionary power, trust, and vulnerability—the
private law identifies these relationships as fiduciary and prescribes
stringent duties to keep fiduciaries loyal to, caring of, and engaged
with the interests of their beneficiaries. As we have explored here,
these three relational characteristics are present in the relationship
of democratic political representation generally and the jury
specifically. What is more, the fiduciary duties that attach to the
private fiduciary help frame the duties that representatives in the
public domain owe their beneficiaries, the people. Casting juries as
fiduciaries contributes to debates about how juries and jurors should
comport themselves within the criminal or civil justice system as
well as to the broader discussion of the place of the jury within the
American architecture of representative democracy.
